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The Structure of Tribunals and the
Appointment of Their Members in
Great Britain*
By CHARLES D. ABLARD**
INTRODUCTION
In the British system administrative tribunals are considered
structurally as extensions of the court system with the same inde-
pendence of decision making. The method of appointment of solici-
tors and barristers as members of tribunals is similar to that used
for the appointment of judges. This contrasts markedly with both
the philosophy and methodology of the selection of administrative
agency members and administrative law judges in the United
States.'
The British tribunals system, as it now exists, began in 1911
with the enactment of the national health insurance programs of
Prime Minister Lloyd George. This was thirty-five years after the
creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the United
States which is regarded as the beginning of the administrative
agencies in the United States.2 British tribunals continued to grow
in. number during the depression years between the wars. A parallel
development of administrative agencies occurred during those years
* This report was originally prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United
States while the author was a Visiting Fellow, Center of International Studies, Cambridge
University in 1974. It was further developed in subsequent visits to Great Britain between
1975 and 1978. The views expressed herein reflect only those of the author.
** B.A., 1952, LL.B., 1954, University of Oklahoma; LL.M., 1959, George Washington
University. Judicial Officer and Chairman, Board of Contract Appeals, Post Office Depart-
ment, 1958-1960; General Counsel, U.S. Information Agency, 1969-1972; Member, Council,
Administrative Conference of the U.S., 1970-1973; Associate Attorney General, Department
of Justice, 1972-1974; General Counsel, Department of the Army, 1975-1977; currently en-
gaged in private practice in Washington, D.C.
1. For a detailed discussion of the history and procedures of the principal British tribu-
nals, see R. WRArr & P. HuTrrcHsSON, ADMImSTRATivE TRIBUNALS (1973).
2. The Railroad Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 20, the antecedent of
the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Feb.
4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379), did not create the new body of administrative law in Great
Britain that began in 1877 in the United States.
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in the United States. The burgeoning of tribunals was a post-war
welfare state phenomenon as services of the state increased.
Although the two systems are substantively more dissimilar
than similar, the structure of the British tribunals system provides
some relevant comparisons for the American lawyer familiar with
administrative agencies in the United States. There are several fun-
damental distinctions between the functions of British tribunals
and administrative agencies in the United States which should be
analyzed .before considering either the structure or the appointment
process of tribunals. 3
First, the British system is a national system with some area-
wide tribunals which in the United States would be regarded as
state or local in character. All are included in the general scheme
of a unitary British tribunal system.
Second, with the exception of transportation regulations, those
areas of administrative agency practice in the United States which
have been given the most attention by administrative lawyers-i. e.,
transportation, communications, energy, labor and trade regula-
tions-are not a part of the British tribunal system since they relate
to matters of fundamental government policy-making which are
decided by the various ministries. Thus, they are outside the scope
of the tribunal structure. In contrast with the United States, the
British have a definite bias against mixing problems of the adminis-
tration of government with that of the adjudication of disputes be-
tween parties by administrative tribunals. The ministries may un-
dertake public inquiries on policy matters in which the public has
an interest, but these are distinct from the operation of tribunals.
However, tribunal operations and public inquiries are sometimes
considered together in establishing general rules of procedural fair-
ness.'
Third, the range of differences in the procedures of the various
tribunals is greater, and the breadth of activities over which they
have jurisdiction to adjudicate is broader, than the agencies of the
United States Federal government. The tribunals also adjudicate on
a greater variety of government activities than even those of state
and local governments in the United States. One reason for this
3. B. ScHwARTz & H. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT (1972). This work presents
a thorough analysis of administrative practices in both Great Britain and the United States.
The book is a result of the Third Anglo-American Legal Conference held at Ditchley Park,
England in 1969.
4. See R. WRArrH & G. LAMB, PuBuc INQwRm As AN INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT (1971)
for a thorough analysis of this distinct system.
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greater range and diversty is that the British central government is
more pervasive in its relations with its citizens than government in
the United States at any level. Additionally, there are variations
among England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Thus,
comparisons are difficult to make and generalizations can be too
simplistic.
There is no statutory mechanism for achieving even basic
norms of procedure between various tribunals as provided by the
Administrative Procedure Act 5 in the United States. The use of lay
persons is typical to the British tribunal system, yet is unique to the
American adjudicative experience. There are some rules of general
application set by the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971,6 such as
requiring reasons for decisions to be given upon request and estab-
lishing procedures for appeals to the High Court. Similar provisions
are found in the specific Acts of Parliament governing tribunals, and
in the rules of procedure for particular tribunals.
This article will examine the structure and composition of Bri-
tish tribunals, discuss the role of lawyers and laymen within the
tribunal system, and draw comparisons, where possible, to adminis-
trative law in the United States.
STRUCTURE
There are several structural variations in British tribunals. The
categorization of tribunals as national, regional or local can best be
analogized to federal, state or local distinctions in the United
States.
Within the three basic catagories there are six tribunals with
national jurisdiction, all of which sit in London: the Civil Aviation
Authority; 7 the Betting Levy Appeal Tribunal;8 the Transport Tri-
bunal;9 the Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade
Marks; 0 and the Commons Commissioners." There are three tri-
5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1977).
6. The Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 66 (amended 1966, c. 43
(current version 1971, c. 62).
7. The Civil Aviation Authority licenses air services, air travel organizers and operating
staff. The Civil Aviation Act, 1971, c. 75.
8. The Betting Levy Appeal Tribunal hears appeals from assessments levied on book-
makers which the Horseracing Betting Levy Board is empowered to make for improvement
of the horse race industry. The Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act, 1963, c. 2.
9. The Transport Tribunal hears appeals from determinations of the authorities which
license vehicles used to transport goods. The Transport Act, 1962, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, c. 46.
10. The Comptroller adjudicates disputes on patents, registered designs and trademarks.
The Patent and Designs Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 29.
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bunals which are London-based but travel on circuit: the Lands
Tribunal,'2 the Special Commissioners of Income Tax,' 3 and the
Pensions Appeal Tribunal. 4
The regional tribunals are quite different from one another be-
cause regions vary depending on local government structure. Lines
of demarcation in organization of local government were changed by
the enactment by Parliament of the Local Government Act of 1972,
which took effect in 1974. A number of local tribunals derive their
power from local authorities and are concernedwith great numbers
of cases primarily involving rights and duties of citizens. The only
tribunals to which appointments are made by local authorities are
the panels for the Local Valuation Courts.' 5
Inasmuch as the various tribunals were created at different
times and for different purposes, their organization follows no uni-
form plan and may differ in accordance with such external factors
as case load and the nature of the tribunal's jurisdiction. Other
factors, including the type of tribunal proceeding and the amount
involved in the controversy, may determine the applicant's willing-
ness to travel and thus, may affect the location of the tribunal.
Many tribunals were established with the advent of the "welfare
state" after World War II to decide matters arising from the govern-
ment's new responsibilities for health and welfare and other services
for citizens. Convenience to claimants is therefore of primary con-
cern to the government.
There are two tribunals which are essentially "courts of appeal"
from lower tribunals: the National Insurance Commissioners and
the Immigration Appeals Tribunal. The National Insurance Com-
missioners have the unique distinction of being appointed by the
Crown on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor. The Lord
Chancellor is a political appointee of the government with duties
11. The Commons Commissioners adjudicate disputes over the use of common land. The
Commons Registration Act, 1965, c. 64.
12. The Lands Tribunal adjudicates appeals from local valuation courts and appeals
from value determinations made by Inland Revenue and local authorities. The Lands Tri-
bunal also has the power to modify or eliminate restrictions on land use. The Taxes Manage-
ment Act, 1970, c. 9.
13. The Special Commissioners of Income Tax are specialists in law and tax who adjudi-
cate appeals from tax assessments. The Taxes Managment Act, 1970, c. 9.
14. The Pensions Appeal Tribunal adjudicates appeals from determinations on the enti-
tlement to or the amount of military pensions. The Pensions Appeal Tribunals Act, 1943, 6
& 7 Geo. 6, c. 39; The War Pensions Act, 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 53.
15. The Local Valuation Courts adjudicate appeals from determinations of the rateable
value of property. The term "rateable" is synonomous with the word "taxable" in the United
States. In Great Britain, a taxpayer is a ratepayer. The General Rate Act, 1967, c. 9.
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akin to a combination of the Attorney General and the Chief Justice
in the United States, but with additional powers. He serves in the
cabinet and appoints all lawyers who act as chairmen or members
of tribunals except immigration adjudicators who are lawyers ap-
pointed by the Home Secretary. 6
The National Insurance Commissioners 7 have the final author-
ity for determining appeals from two hundred National Insurance
Local Tribunals" and thirteen Medical Appeal Tribunals."1 This
tribunal is one of the most senior of administrative tribunals and the
one frequently cited as having the best developed and most system-
atic procedures. Judicial review of decisions of the Commissioners
is by the Court of Appeal, the highest appellate court, while deci-
sions of most other tribunals are reviewed by the Queen's Bench
Division of the High Court of Justice, the highest trial court.21
The Immigration Appeal Tribunal hears appeals from decisions
of twenty-nine legally qualified immigration adjudicators to whom
decisions of the Home Secretary on entry or visa applications may
be appealed.
The former National Industrial Relations Court which reviewed
decisions of the Industrial Tribunals"2 was in the appellate category,
although technically it was not a tribunal but a court of specialized
jurisdiction.2s However, its Chairman, a former justice of the High
Court, Sir John Donaldson, believed it should function more as a
tribunal than a court. The National Industrial Relations Court was
the subject of considerable controversy and was strongly criticized
by the Labour party during the February 1974 general election cam-
paign. The Court was abolished by the Government in mid-1974,
16. The Home Secretary is a cabinet minister with powers similar to, but broader than,
those of the Secretary of the Interior in the United States. He serves as head of the ministry
known as the Home Office.
17. The Social Security Act, 1975, c. 14, § 97.
18. The National Insurance Local Tribunals hear appeals from the decisions of insurance
officers on national insurance, unemployment benefits, sickness and injuries. Id. §§ 97, 114.
19. The Medical Appeal Tribunals hear appeals from departmental medical boards on
industrial injuries. Id. § 97 n. iii.
20. Judicial review of tribunal actions and decisions is complex and evolving. See S. A.
DE SMrrH, CONSTrrTmONAL AND ADimTRATrm LAw ch. 26 (2d ed. 1973).
21. Proposals have been made for the creation of a specialized administrative court to
review tribunal actions. See A New Bill of Rights, (1978) issued by the Conservation Political
Centre (the research arm of the British Conservative Party).
22. The Industrial Training Act, 1964, c. 16, § 12. Most appeals arise under the Industrial
Relations Act, 1971, c. 72.
23. The Restrictive Practices Court also has a High Court justice sitting as chairman and
fits into the appellate category. It is closely akin to the Federal Trade Commission in terms
of subject matter, but is a court of original jurisdiction.
No. 2]
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after Labour won the election. Appeals from Industrial Tribunals
were then taken directly to the Queen's Bench Division of the High
Court of Justice, the traditional appellate forum for judicial review
of tribunal actions. The Employment Protection Act was enacted by
Parliament in 1975 and provides that appeals on points of law are
to be taken to the employment Appeal Tribunal which is comprised
of certain nominated High Court judges and law members, a struc-
ture unique among tribunals.
One of the most interesting recent structural developments has
been the application of a strongly directed presidential system to
those tribunals which meet in multiple locations.24 Thus, the pat-
tern of operations of the Chief National Insurance Commissioner is
being applied to other tribunals. For example, in 1973, the presiden-
tial system was adopted by the Value Added Tax Tribunal, one of
the newest tribunals, created to adjudicate disputes concerning this
new form of taxation established as a result of Britain's entry into
the Common Market.5 The Value Added Tax Tribunal has nine
chairmen, who are lawyers appointed by the Lord Chancellor, and
a full-time President who sits in London. Each chairman sits with
two lay persons whom he selects for each case from a citizen panel.
The Council on Tribunals, the oversight agency for tribunals in
Great Britain,26 has supported the presidential system as that which
is the best suited for tribunals sitting throughout the country. The
most authoritative book on the subject, written under the sponsor-
ship of the Royal Institute of Public Administration 21 lists six ad-
vantages of the presidential system:
1. Independence from parent departments since the presidential
tribunal operates on its own premises with its own staff.
2. Better communications between the different panels of the
tribunals and between the department and head of the presidential
tribunal.2
3. Public relations for the tribunal in establishing its reputation
24. Under a presidential system, the chief officer acts as a central authority supervising
the scattered local tribunal chairmen.
25. The Finance Acts, 1972, c. 41; The Finance Act, 1973, c. 51; The Finance Act, 1974,
c. 30.
26. Ablard, Some Comparisons Between the Council on Tribunals and the Administra-
tive Conference of the United States 24 Am. J. OF CoMP. L. 73 (1976).
27. R. WRArrH & P. HUTCHESSON, supra note 1, at 90.
28. Communications between the department and the president are generally considered
as being less subject to political interference than are similar communications between the
department and the local chairmen, who are thought to be more vulnerable to political
pressure.
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with the public and its constituents.
4. Better support for the professional civil service staff through a
centralized control mechanism.
5. More effective development of tribunal case law through con-
trol of the cases selected to be reported by the tribunal.
6. Consistency of practice, procedure and decisions.
To an American lawyer, the last listed advantage would probably
seem most important for the effective management of a system of
administrative adjudication.
COMPOSITION
There are four distinct patterns in the composition of tribunals.
Each pattern dictates in some measure the type of appointments
which will be made to the tribunal.
The first pattern consists of an individual sitting alone. It is
best exemplified by the ten National Insurance Commissioners who
generally sit alone to hear appeals, although the National Insurance
Act, as amended in 1946, provides that three commissioners may sit
in a panel to hear cases involving "a question of law of special
difficulty." 9 These panels are convened by the Chief National In-
surance Commissioner when such a question is presented.
The second pattern is that of a fixed membership panel consist-
ing of a Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and four to six other mem-
bers, all of whom may be present at any hearing, but only a quorum
is required for action. Examples of tribunals employing this pattern
of composition are the Transport Tribunal and the Civil Aviation
Authority-the two tribunals most similar to United States federal
regulatory agencies, namely the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the Federal Aviation Authority.
The third pattern is a single panel whose membership is not
fixed but has a chairman and one or two other members drawn from
larger panels. The Medical Appeal Tribunals follow this pattern.
They decide questions of medical evidence for the National Insur-
ance Commissioners and usually have two chairmen available, both
of whom are lawyers, sitting with two members who are medical
practitioners drawn from panels." The Immigration Appeal Tri-
bunal also uses the single panel system, its lay members sitting with
a legally qualified chairman.
29. The National Insurance Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 67.
30. For a proposal of a similar concept in the United States, see R. DIXON, SOCIAL
SacuRrry, DisABmmrry AN MASS JusTICE-A PROBLEM IN WELFARE ADJUDICATION (1973).
No. 2]
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The fourth pattern is a representative panel system. While the
members of such panels generally reflect the views of certain inter-
est groups, the selection is designed to make certain that the panels
perform a judicial function rather than to encourage contention
between members representing conflicting interest groups. Tribun-
als employing this system are described as "balanced" tribunals.
Typical interests balanced through this device are the interests of
employers and employees before the National Insurance and In-
dustrial Tribunals; landowners and farmers before the Agricultural
Land Tribunals;31 and consumers, producers and retailers before the
Milk and Dairy Tribunals.2 The Supplementary Benefit Appeal
Tribunals 3 3 adjudicate disputes arising under a welfare system de-
signed to provide a minimum family income. Their panels generally
consist of one trade union member and one member of the local
community sitting with a chairman. Fewer than ten percent of the
chairmen are lawyers 34 and the Council on Tribunals advocates a
substantial increase in that percentage. Some members of the
Council on Tribunals support establishing a presidential system for
the Supplementary Benefit Appeal Tribunals with a lawyer chair-
man of each tribunal. Presently, the panel membership of this tri-
bunal is citizen-oriented. In the appointment of members, an effort
is made to choose persons who know the community and its prob-
lems.35
A hybrid version of these four patterns has been developed for
the Industrial Tribunals. Formerly, the Industrial Tribunals used
the "employer-employee" membership dichotomy within a repre-
sentative panel system. However, the trade union members resigned
due to the political controversy over the Industrial Relations Act of
1921 which tightened control over trade union activities. Following
31. The Agricultural Land Tribunals adjudicate disputes between landlords and tenants
regarding drainage, bad husbandry, and notices to quit, as well as disputes between land
owners on such matters as drainage and clearing of ditches. The Agriculture Act, 1947, 10 &
11 Geo. 6, c. 48, § 73.
32. The Milk and Dairy Tribunals hear matters, both initially and on appeal, regarding
the registration of dairy farms and licences for dairies and milk producers. The Food and
Drugs Act, 1955, 4 Eliz. 2, c. 16.
33. The Supplementary Benefits Act, 1976, c. 71, § 15.
34. Bell, Research Study on Supplemental Appeal Tribunals (Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1975).
35. The supplementary benefits program is the present program which began with the
Poor Law of 17th century England. It has received much attention since its work touches the
lives of a great number of citizens, yet it is generally thought to be the most poorly adminis-
tered of all the tribunals. See Bradley, Reform of Supplementary Benefit Tribunals-The
Key Issues, 27 N. IR. L.Q. 96 (1976).
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their resignation, a single panel was established consisting of
"persons appearing. . . to have knowledge or experience of employ-
ment in industry or commerce" to be appointed after consultation
with organizations representing those groups.36 This change makes
clear the understanding that members of a tribunal should not re-
gard themselves as representatives of specific interests, but as judi-
cial officers assigned to dispense justice even-handedly.
A former Lord Chancellor, Lord Gardiner, commented that,
even under the old structure reference to the members as "the em-
ployer's representative" or the "employees' representative" was in-
accurate since they were appointed to represent nothing but the
interests of justice. Whether this was ever in fact the case may be
debated. However, despite the expressed desire on the part of some
trade unions to return to the old system, specific representation of
special interest groups has been eliminated.
The concept of lay justice is solidly built into the British system
of the administration of justice. It is best illustrated by the member-
ship of the magistrates' courts" which is comprised exclusively com-
prised of laymen. The appointment of laymen to tribunal panels is
a key element in developing citizen involvement in the process of
government.
The quality of the members who serve influences the character
of each of the tribunals. Impartiality is a highly sought characteris-
tic in new members. That tribunals are staffed by independent
persons rather than by government officials is evidence of the im-
portance of impartiality. A finding that a member was subject to
outside influence in the course of his decisionmaking has been held
to invalidate his decision." This further illustrates the view that
tribunals are governed by the same principles which control the
judiciary and any attempt to influence decisionmaking is not only
unethical, but is against legal policy. The requirement of impartial-
ity applies equally to those tribunals that adjudicate questions be-
tween a citizen and his government and those that adjudicate ques-
tions between citizens.
Generally, the qualifications required for lay members on tri-
bunals are high. The presence of lay members contributes greatly
to both the actual and apparent fair determination of issues. Their
36. Industrial Tribunals (England and Wales) (Amendment) Regulations 1971 (STAT.
INST. 1971 No. 1660 § 2).
37. Reichert, The Magistrates' Courts: Lay Cornerstone of English Justice; 57
JUnICATURE 138 (1973).
38. Simms Motor Units Ltd. v. Minister of Labour [1946] 2 All E.R. 201.
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presence also helps to generate confidence in the system on the part
of applicants appearing before the tribunal. The willingness of edu-
cated and qualified laymen to devote time to tribunal membership
speaks well of public service in Great Britain.39
ROLE OF LAWYERS
Lawyers have a more limited role in society in Great Britain
than in the United States and there is a fear in some quarters that
their increased use in the administrative process will lead to undue
formalization and delay. While this view has also been voiced in the
United States, it is decidedly more pronounced in Great Britain. It
was a topic of discussion during the debates in Parliament on the
establishment of the Council on Tribunals in 1958.11 It is reflected
both in the relatively infrequent appearances of lawyers and the
extensive use of lay representatives in tribunal proceedings.
The bias against lawyers is illustrated by the refusal of succes-
sive Parliamentary Commissioners for Administration4 to even
employ a lawyer on their staffs. The reason given was the fear that
a lawyer would take too legalistic a view of administrative problems
presented to him for action in his role as ombudsman. One factor
which has increased the difficulty of appointing lawyers as chairmen
of the Supplementary Benefit Appeals Tribunals is the expressed
policy of the Home Office4" that those tribunals have the character
and should take the approach of social workers rather than the
character or approach of adjudicators of benefit disputes.4 3
The Council on Tribunals and the Law Society are attempting
to increase the number of lawyers sitting on tribunals in the belief
that a greater number of lawyer tribunal members will regularize
tribunal operations and ultimately produce better results. This
39. The use of lay trade union members has recently come under sharp attack by the
Conservative Party which believes these positions have been used by the Government to
dispense political favors. Speech of Paul Johnson, former editor of NEW STATESMAN, at Brigh-
ton, England, October 11, 1978.
40. 575 PARL. DEs., H. L. (. ser.) 400 (1958).
41. The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration is the ombudsman who reports
to the Parliament. For a general description of his role in government and society, see JuSTIcE,
OuR FarrEREV OMBUDSMAN (1977).
42. See note 16, supra.
43. The Supplementary Benefit Appeal Tribunal system has undergone extensive scru-
tiny during the past twelve months from the Lord Chancellor's department and the Council
of Tribunals. One result is that a new system for training chairmen has gone into effect.
Another is that a procedural guide has been published which urges the giving of adequate
reasons for decisions. Annual Report of Council on Tribunals, 1977-1978.
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movement has met with opposition primarily from trade unions who
fear the judicialization of proceedings. The difference between the
roles of lawyers in British and American society also affects the
representation of parties before tribunals. While few lawyers appear
before tribunals, more solicitors than barristers" appear, in relative
proportion to their numbers. There are no solicitors or barristers
who exclusively specialize in tribunal practice although some have
extensive practices before the industrial tribunals. The tribunals
before whom lawyers most frequently appear are the Industrial Tri-
bunals and the Value Added Tax Tribunals-the two fora whose
decisions have the strongest impact on trade and commerce. Appel-
lants in industrial, benefit and welfare cases are often represented
by legal counsel provided by the trade unions for their members or
by the Citizens Advice Bureau.45
For several years, proposals have been pending before the Bri-
tish government to make legal aid available to litigants appearing
before tribunals in the same manner as it is available to litigants
appearing before the courts. If this occurs, there undoubtedly will
be more representation by lawyers, before all tribunals. The largest
impact will be felt by the social service tribunals whose applicants
are generally less able to pay for legal representation. There is con-
siderable variation in the degree of formality in hearings before
tribunals with the least formal being social welfare hearings on sup-
plementary benefits, which are comparable to social security adju-
dications in the United States.
Often neither litigants nor counsel appear personally at hear-
ings. This fact is the cause of some concern inasmuch as access to
the forum has been a critical factor in tribunal planning, and yet it
has not resulted in personal appearances. The Chairman's responsi-
bility to ensure complete presentation of the case to the tribunal
members becomes particularly important when litigants are not
represented by legal counsel. This problem is compounded when
there is a lay chairman of the tribunal. The infrequency of appear-
44. The professions of solicitor and barrister developed from different origins to perform
separate functions. The distinction is that the barrister has the exclusive right of appearance
in the superior courts, while the solicitor has the exclusive right of direct contact with clients
on all matters of ordinary business. Solicitors may appear in the lower courts and both may
appear before tribunals.
45. The Citizens Advice Bureau performs a function similar to that performed by neigh-
borhood legal assistance offices in the United States, although the Bureau's offices are gener-
ally not staffed by lawyers. Sloviter, Let's Look at Citizens Advice Bureaux, 65 ABAJ 567
(April 1979).
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ances and representation increases the need for lawyer chairmen at
tribunal hearings.
The influential role of the tribunal clerk lends additional sup-
port to the argument favoring the appointment of lawyer chairmen.
Tribunal clerks are usually career civil servants assigned by the
ministry whose matters are under tribunal review. This suggests
that the ministries may be in a position to undermine the independ-
ence of the tribunals. With respect to the subject matter being re-
viewed by the tribunal, the tribunal clerk is often more knowledge-
able than many of the tribunal members. Thus, his advice can be
quite influential even though he lacks a vote. The Council of Tri-
bunals has called attention to this problem in the past. The best
solution to the potentially biased influence of the tribunal clerk
appears to be the appointment of a strong chairman, preferably a
lawyer.
APPOINTMENT PROCESS
One of the results of the 1957 Report of the Committee on
Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (chaired by Sir Oliver
Franks) which led to the creation of the Council on Tribunals, was
a change in the mode of appointment of tribunal members." The
Franks Committee found that most chairmen and members were
being appointed by the minister whose department dealt with the
subject matter of the tribunal. Although they found no evidence of
undue influence, they recommended that all future chairmen be
appointed by the Lord Chancellor to avoid any appearance of bias.
The Franks Committee considered proposals that all members be
appointed by the Lord Chancellor, but declined to make such a
recommendation on the grounds that it was impractical or, at best,
a transparent formality. The Franks Committee, however, did rec-
ommend that the Council on Tribunals, rather than the minister,
appoint tribunal members. This recommendation was rejected by
Parliament when the Council on Tribunals was created in 1958.
Although changes have been made in the appointment process
of chairmen, the appointment of members still rests largely in the
hands of the ministers of the various departments. The Lord Chan-
cellor himself appoints the members to some tribunals, such as the
Pensions Appeal Tribunal 7 and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. 8
46. Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals & Enquiries, CMND. No. 218
(July 1957).
47. See note 14, supra.
48. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal hears appeals from adjudications on entry into
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In practice, however, the Lord Chancellor solicits, and is generally
guided by, the recommendations of the appropriate minister.
Over 65% of all statutory tribunals now have chairmen who are
appointed either directly by the Lord Chancellor or indirectly, with
the actual selection made by a minister from a list submitted by the
Lord Chancellor.4' These include the National Insurance Local Tri-
bunals, Medical Appeal Tribunals, Supplementary Benefit Appeal
Tribunals and Rent Assessment Committees. Of the remaining tri-
bunals, many are policy tribunals, such as the Civil Aviation Au-
thority and the Traffic Commissioners, which primarily have ad-
ministrative or advisory functions with the added duty of licensing.
The chairmen of these tribunals are considered to be more properly
subject to ministerial appointment because they are more involved
in policy formulation than in the adjudication of disputes.
There are two instances, however, where for unique reasons a
tribunal chairman, whose functions are primarily adjudicative, is
appointed by the minister. One is the Chief Immigration Adjudica-
tor who is appointed by the Home Secretary. The Chief Immigration
Adjudicator is thus made primus inter pares among his fellow adju-
dicators in deciding immigration disputes at the first hearing level
of adjudication. This ministerial appointment is in accordance with
the recommendations of a 1966 study of the immigration system
which was chaired by Sir Roy Wilson, and which proposed the pres-
ent structure through which immigration appeals are taken to the
Home Secretary." The study cited the 1957 Franks Committee re-
port to support its recommendations on appointments. In view,
however, of the general desire of the Franks Committee to make
certain that sensitive cases were handled by persons who at least
appeared to be or were in fact independent, the report of that Com-
mittee would not appear to support appointment of the Chief Immi-
gration Adjudicator by the Home Secretary. The second instance is
the Chairman of the Milk and Dairie Tribunal, who is appointed by
the Minister of Agriculture for largely historical reasons. Although
the Milk and Dairie Tribunal is now considered to be a full-fledged
tribunal, it was originally only nominally a tribunal, established
during the war as an administrative body to manage agricultural
problems such as wartime shortages of commodities.
The recommendation of the Franks Committee regarding the
and exclusion from the country. The Immigration Act, 1971, c. 77, §§ 12-21.
49. The Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1971, c. 62, § 7.
50. Report of the Committee on Immigration Appeals, CMND. No. 3387 (1966).
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appointment of members by the Council on Tribunals has not been
approved. Many reasons, including the reluctance of the Council on
Tribunals to assume the function, make it unlikely that the recom-
mendation will be followed. One factor contributing to that reluct-
ance is the potential difficulty in criticizing the operations of a
tribunal whose members have been appointed by the Council. Such
critical appraisal is currently a major function of the Council. As a
general rule, the ministers continue to appoint tribunal members,
but are accountable to Parliament for their appointments. Yet, de-
spite appointment by the ministers, there seems to be little problem
in maintaining the independence of tribunal members. The presi-
dent of a tribunal appointed by a minister usually makes certain he
achieves that independence.
SELECTION AND QUALIFICATION OF MEMBERS
Any generalization on the selection process of tribunal mem-
bers is difficult since few general rules apply. The appointment of
chairmen who are lawyers is a subject which lawyers may find par-
ticularly interesting. Only certain tribunals are required by statute
to have lawyer chairmen. These include the principal appellate tri-
bunals and those tribunals whose members have medical exper-
tise-Pensions Appeal Tribunals and National Insurance Medical
Appeal Tribunals. There are other tribunals where, although not
required by statute, it is considered advantageous that members be
lawyers because of the tribunals' particular subject matter jurisdic-
tion. These are the Industrial Tribunals, the Value Added Tax Tri-
bunals, National Insurance Local Tribunals and Immigration Adju-
dicators. Thus, the pattern has developed for lawyers, usually bar-
risters, to chair the tribunal with laymen from either the general
public or from specified community groups serving as members.
There are various specific qualifications for membership on the
different tribunals. For example, the chairman of the Independent
Schools Tribunal5' must not only be a practicing member of the Bar,
but also "a family man" by tradition. The qualifications required
of tribunal members reflect the fact that the tribunals are regarded
as specialized agencies requiring some expertise. The general re-
quirements of professional knowledge and practical experience are
imposed on members but not on the Chairman. The following result
51. The Independent Schools Tribunal hears appeals from requirements to close down
or remedy a defect in an independent school (a school not financed by local education authori-
ties). The Education Act, 1944, 7 & 8 Geo. 6, c. 31.
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is apparent. Doctors are appointed to Medical Appeal Tribunals,
value appraisers to Land Tribunals and accountants to the Betting
Levy Appeal Tribunals. Not surprisingly, the Lord Chancellor con-
sults with professional associations during the selection process. The
Lord Chancellor has, for example, ninety-six advisory committees
to help him in the selection of the general commissioners who deal
with income tax appeals. The professional bodies suggest the names
of candidates to the Lord Chancellor. Such consultation is required
by some acts of Parliament.52
Tribunal members generally are not interchangeable among
tribunals and this is a matter of concern to the Lord Chancellor. The
number of members of a particular tribunal is, in most instances,
established by the substantive statute creating the tribunal. At the
time Parliament created the various tribunals it established mem-
bership requirements based on anticipated work load. The projected
case load estimates have proven largely inaccurate. As a result there
are too many Tax Tribunal members and too few members of the
industrial tribunals. The use of some part-time Value Added Tax
Tribunal members in the industrial tribunals represents the first
cross-utilization of tribunal members-a trend which the Lord
Chancellor hopes will develop and expand. This trend is consistent
with developments in the United States which increasingly permit
the transfer of administrative law judges among agencies. Selective
certification procedures used by agencies in the United States tend,
however, to result in the selection of judges who have had experience
in the hiring agency. 3
Depending on the particular structure and operation (trial or
appellate) of the individual tribunal its overall function may be
more akin to either that of a government agency or an administra-
tive law judge. The appointment process for tribunal members com-
bines some aspects of the political process for selection of federal
agency members with some aspects of the process for selection of
administrative law judges in the United States. Yet the political
emphasis is very slight in Great Britain and there is no official in
the United States whose power in the appointment of either Federal
Judges or administrative law judges is comparable to that of the
Lord Chancellor in England.
52. As an example, the Lands Tribunal Act of 1949 requires consultation with the Presi-
dent of the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors. The Lands Tribunal Act, 1949, 12, 13, &
14 Geo. 6, c. 42.
53. Miller, The Vice of Selective Certification in the Appointment of Hearing
Examiners, 20 AD. L. REV. 477 (1968).
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RECRUITING
There is no organized system for the recruitment of tribunal
members such as that employed by the United States in selecting
administrative law judges for administrative agencies and depart-
ments.5 4 Casting the net for persons to fill the chairmanships of
tribunals is subject to many vagaries of chance. The Lord Chancel-
lor's office maintains a list of suitable and available people for each
particular tribunal which is supplemented with new names as re-
quired. Interviews with candidates are conducted by the appointing
ministry and the Lord Chancellor's staff before an appointment is
made.
The Lord Chancellor, assisted by a small staff in his office, uses
essentially the same recruiting process and screening system for
appointments of lawyers to tribunals that he uses for appointments
to the British courts. Unlike the other ministeries which look for
some specific experience in appointing chairmen, he looks not for
expertise in the subject area of the particular tribunal, but for judi-
cial temperament, demeanor and those general qualities needed for
judging. The lay member may be counted on to provide the social
welfare approach or specialized expertise if needed. In the selection
process the Lord Chancellor canvasses a variety of sources including
judges and prominent citizens of the area where the tribunal may
be sitting. He works with the Senate of the Inns of the Court55 on
the appointment of barristers and the Law Society5 on the appoint-
ment of solicitors. Applicants must have seven years standing in the
legal profession. In the United States, the closest approximation to
bar liaison is the use of lawyers with administrative practice on the
selection panels used by the office of personell management, for-
merly the Civil Service Commission.5 7
Judges are chosen, with only rare exception, from among the
ranks of barristers, of whom there are only 3600. The selection of
lawyers as tribunal members, however, is more difficult because
54. Miller, The Need for Improvements in the Hearing Examiner Recruitment Program
of the Civil Service Commission, 19 AD. L. Rav. 319 (1967). The author describes the system
then in effect which remains essentially unchanged today for selection of administrative law
judges. See also Miller, The Civil Service Commission's New Hearing Examiner Recruitment
Program, 17 AD. L. Ray. 104 (1965) for an earlier description.
55. The Senate of the Inns of the Court is the management body for the four Inns of Court
and is the means of admission of barristers both to the bar and to the Professional Society of
Barristers.
56. The Law Society is the professional society for solicitors.
57. Miller, supra note 54 at 320.
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they are selected from the full pool of 42,000 solicitors about whom
much less is known by the Lord Chancellor and his staff.
The great growth in tribunals coincided with the decline of the
British Empire and the consequent availability of many qualified
former colonial judges whose services abroad were no longer needed.
The appointment of a great number of them to tribunal panels may
have been a mixed blessing. These appointments have been the
subject of some criticism, particularly the appointments to in-
dustrial tribunals, where it was believed that some industrial rela-
tions experience was desirable. The use of former colonial judges
also results in more formalized procedures than otherwise might
have been developed, as various traditions of the colonial legal sys-
tem continue to be honored.
At present there is concern over the availability of legally quali-
fied persons to chair tribunals. The positions do not attract a suffi-
cient number of the more qualified senior members of the bar. Some
unsolicited applications for the best positions are received by the
Lord Chancellor; other appointees are sought out by him upon the
recommendation of his staff. In view of the high retirement age
(generally seventy with possible extensions to seventy-two) a lawyer
might enter the ranks of the tribunals at age fifty-two and serve
twenty years, the minimum qualifying period for a government pen-
sion. The criticism frequently is voiced that service on a tribunal is
too often viewed as a form of semi-retirement. Many persons inter-
ested in full-time positions are those who feel that judicial appoint-
ments may not be forthcoming and regard membership on a tri-
bunal as second choice. Part-time appointments are often made to
those who may eventually desire a judicial appointment and believe
that part-time service on a tribunal would be helpful to that end.
The selection process is non-political and close party affiliation may
be disqualifying regardless of which party is in power. It is also a
purely subjective process with no fixed standard against which
background or specific experience is measured. The system is far
less structured than that employed by the United States in the
selection of administrative law judges. 58 Each nation's system falls
short of proposals in the United States for a unified corps of admin-
istrative law judges," an administrative court,60 or a specialized
58. Id. at 321.
59. Segal, Administrative Law Judge: Twenty Years of Program and the Road Ahead,
62 A.B.A.J. 1424 (1976).
60. The Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 66 (amended 1966, c. 43)
(current version 1971, c. 62).
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court."1
At the urging of the Council on Tribunals, there has been a
conscious effort to appoint more women to tribunals. However, little
effort has been made to obtain minority group representation. De-
spite the large number of East Asians in England, and their frequent
appearance as parties and as counsel before immigration tribunals,
there is no immigration adjudicator of East Asian origin. In the
supplementary benefits field, where most of the applicants are from
the lower economic spectrum of the community, the Claimants
Union has pressed with some success for a broader base of member-
ship on the tribunals to reflect a wider cross-section of the com-
munity. The desired broader base would include greater representa-
tion from lower income groups.
TERMS AND COMPENSATION
There are some fifty to sixty permanent, full time, salaried and
pensionable appointments on the principal tribunals. In addition,
there are several hundred part-time members throughout the coun-
try. The terms and conditions of service may vary considerably
among tribunals, as does the retirement age. Generally, however,
retirement is at age seventy, with extensions to age seventy-two.
Given the retirement age, very few persons over the age of,65 are
appointed to tribunals. The appointment of persons under the age
of fifty is also rare, although a few members under thirty years old
have been appointed. On the Rent Assessment Committees, for ex-
ample, the reported average age was sixty, with one-third in the
twenty-five to fifty-five age group, and two-thirds in the over fifty-
five age group.2
Where possible, the full-time members' salaries are equated
with those of judges or senior civil servants. It is this first group
which represents the hard core, permanent "judiciary" on tribunals.
The amount of compensation depends on the statute that estab-
lishes the tribunal body, and on negotiation between the Lord Chan-
cellor's office and Civil Service Commissioners. The result is an
unfortunate disparity of pay scales leading to certain inequities in
the compensation provided the various tribunal members.
In the second group are those part-time members who serve on
61. Report of the Special Committee on Legal Services and Procedure, 1956 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE ABA 491.
62. Cavenagh & Hawker, The Membership of Tribunals, (Report to the Social Science
Research Council 1972).
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panels and those who are appointed ad hoc, with the payment of a
fee for each day of sitting. Strange variations exist in the amount
of the daily fees, with no apparent consistency among tribunals.
Payments bear little relationship to the complexity of the work.
These discrepancies again arise from the manner in which fees are
negotiated between the civil service department and the Lord Chan-
cellor's office. In general, the fees earned by members of the second
group are modest. In some cases, the fee paid is only for "loss of
earning," which means that a retired person gets nothing.
A third group of part-time members receives no remuneration
or, at most, reimbursement of earnings lost due to service as a
tribunal member.
SUMMARY
Parliament has never attempted to establish a nationally stan-
darized appointment process for tribunal members. It may be sim-
pler for Parliament to create new tribunals than to determine who
should serve on the existing ones. The 1972-1973 report of the Coun-
cil on Tribunals criticized the trend towards proliferation13 and rei-
terated its appeal for consolidation of tribunals operating in certain
related subject areas. 4
The limited use of legal counsel in tribunal proceedings affects
the functioning of tribunals. It also makes the use of lawyers as
chairmen even more essential in terms of developing a case and
record at the hearing. The lawyer member is usually the strongest
member of the tribunal and some cynics say his major role is to keep
the lay members from going off on "tangents" which are not perti-
nent to the legal issues. If an opinion is written, it is usually the legal
member who writes it.65
Given the small bar and the divided legal profession in Brit-
ain,66 with most of the legally trained chairmen coming from the
limited ranks of the barristers, an informal selection process, using
63. Annual Report of the Council on Tribunals, 1972-1973 (Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1973).
64. Id. The Council said it still awaited "with interest" action on its 1971 proposal to
implement the recommendation of the Franks Committee for a consolidated tribunal on rent.
The Society of Labour Lawyers recommended consolidation of all social security tribunals to
the Franks Committee in 1957.
65. The national or regional tribunal chairman decides whether opinions are published
or reported.
66. For an analysis of the education and training of lawyers in Great Biitain, see Ablard,
Observations on the English System of Legal Education: Does it Point the Way to Changes
in the United States?, 29 J. oF LEGAL EDUC. 148 (1978).
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subjective standards of evaluation, is both viable and effective. This
process for selecting chairmen and the extensive use of lay members
are the two principal features of tribunal composition.
The use of laymen has been described as another manifestation
of the British obsession with amateurism. Yet, the use of laymen
breeds a public confidence which might otherwise not be obtained
in a system of administrative justice. Despite the important role of
laymen in tribunal operations, lawyers serving as chairmen and as
members are needed to make the system work.
